Washington and Lee Law Review Online
Volume 75

Issue 1

Article 2

Fall 10-9-2018

Originalism and Congressional Power to Enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment
Christopher W. Schmidt
Chicago-Kent College of Law, cschmidt@kentlaw.iit.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr-online
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Courts Commons, Fourteenth Amendment Commons,
Jurisprudence Commons, Legal History Commons, Legislation Commons, and the Supreme Court of the
United States Commons

Recommended Citation
Christopher W. Schmidt, Originalism and Congressional Power to Enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, 75
WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 33 (2018), https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr-online/vol75/iss1/2

This Response is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School Journals at Washington and Lee
University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington and Lee Law
Review Online by an authorized editor of Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. For
more information, please contact christensena@wlu.edu.

Originalism and Congressional Power
to Enforce the Fourteenth Amendment
Christopher W. Schmidt ∗
Abstract
In this Essay, I argue that originalism conflicts with the
Supreme Court’s current jurisprudence defining the scope of
Congress’ power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. Under the
standard established in Boerne v. Flores, the Court limits
congressional power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
to statutory remedies premised on judicially defined interpretations
of Fourteenth Amendment rights. A commitment to originalism as
a method of judicial constitutional interpretation challenges the
premise of judicial interpretive supremacy in Section 5
jurisprudence in two ways. First, as a matter of history, an
originalist reading of Section 5 provides support for broad judicial
deference to congressional constitutional interpretive authority.
Second, even if one accepts originalism as the best way for courts to
interpret the Constitution, this assumption does not necessarily
apply to nonjudicial actors when they are fulfilling their own
constitutional responsibilities—such as members of Congress
acting to enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Placing judicial originalism into the foreground of our discussion
of Section 5 jurisprudence thus offers additional support for a
broader reading of the congressional enforcement power than exists
today under Boerne.
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I. Introduction
This Essay considers the relationship between originalism and
the scope of Congress’ power to enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment. I approach this topic by exploring the provocative
hypothetical William Araiza presents in his important and
enlightening new Article, Arming the Second Amendment—and
Enforcing the Fourteenth 1: a federal statute, based on the
enforcement clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, that protects
the Second Amendment’s right to bear arms beyond those rights
the Supreme Court explicitly recognized in District of Columbia v.
Heller. 2 Araiza uses his hypothetical to illuminate flaws in the
Court’s current enforcement power doctrine and to propose a
different approach that would be more consistent and effective in
defining the scope of the enforcement power. 3
Araiza’s central argument is that the doctrine the Supreme
Court has developed to determine the scope of congressional
authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment—the
1. William D. Araiza, Arming the Second Amendment—and Enforcing the
Fourteenth, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1801 (2017).
2. 554 U.S. 570 (2008). The right that Congress would be enforcing would
be the Fourteenth Amendment’s right to due process of law, which the Court has
read to include the Second Amendment’s right to bear arms. McDonald v. City of
Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010). Araiza, Arming, supra note 1, at 1804–06.
3. Araiza’s Arming the Second Amendment builds on and expands his
previous work on the enforcement power. WILLIAM D. ARAIZA, ENFORCING THE
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE: CONGRESSIONAL POWER, JUDICIAL DOCTRINE, AND
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2015); William D. Araiza, The Enforcement Power in Crisis,
18 U. PA. J. CONST. L. ONLINE 1 (2015); William D. Araiza, After the Tiers:
Windsor, Congressional Power to Enforce Equal Protection, and the Challenge of
Pointillist Constitutionalism, 94 B.U. L. REV. 367 (2014); William D. Araiza,
Deference to Congressional Fact-finding in Rights-Enforcing and Rights-Limiting
Legislation, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 878 (2013); William D. Araiza, New Groups and
Old Doctrine: Rethinking Congressional Power to Enforce the Equal Protection
Clause, 37 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 451 (2010).
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provision that empowers Congress to “enforce, by appropriate
legislation,” the rights guaranteed in the amendment 4—centers on
the wrong object of analysis. Under the standard the Court
established in Boerne v. Flores, 5 Congress has the power under
Section 5 to pass legislation to protect Fourteenth Amendment
rights as long as these statutory remedies are premised on
judicially defined interpretations of these rights. 6 When Congress
uses its Section 5 authority to protect against rights violations,
these preventative measures must be “proportional and congruent”
to the scope of any record of constitutional violations by the state. 7
Araiza argues that this congruence and proportionality analysis
should be based on “core constitutional meaning,” rather than the
“decisional heuristics” the Court has developed in order to
implement that constitutional meaning. 8 Thus, in the context of
his hypothetical legislation enforcing the Second Amendment’s
right to bear arms, the proper baseline for measuring congruence
and proportionality should be the meaning of the Second
Amendment rather than the doctrinal gloss the courts have
developed in their case law as they have adjudicated disputes
involving this constitutional right. And this core constitutional
meaning, according to Araiza, following the premise of the Court’s
reasoning in Heller, derives from the original meaning of the
Second Amendment. 9
I find Araiza’s argument persuasive to the extent that,
working within the contours of existing constitutional doctrine, as
defined by both Boerne and Heller, he offers an improved version
of the Section 5 doctrine. Compared to the Court’s current doctrine,
Araiza’s approach is more solidly grounded in the original meaning
of the Fourteenth Amendment. 10 By paying more attention to the
relative institutional competencies of the Court and Congress, it
offers a more functional enforcement power. And Araiza’s
alternative produces a clearer and more predictable Section 5
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 5.
521 U.S. 507 (1997).
Id. at 539.
Id. at 520.
Araiza, Arming, supra note 1, at 1847.
Id. at 1851–56, 1895–96.
Infra Part I.
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doctrine. His distinction between constitutional meaning and
constitutional doctrine improves upon the excessively juricentric
nature of the Court’s current interpretation of Section 5. 11 His
approach does not require Congress, when exercising its own
constitutional responsibilities, to adopt the posture of an inferior
court, whose job is to discern and apply the often complex
peculiarities of the Supreme Court’s constitutional jurisprudence.
Araiza’s less juricentric doctrine also offers a doctrine that allows
Section 5 to better serve its democracy-enhancing role. 12 Araiza, in
short, offers a better Section 5 doctrine.
In this essay I press on Araiza’s analysis on one dimension,
questioning his assumption that the original meaning of a
constitutional provision, as determined by the Court, constitutes
the “core constitutional meaning” that should be the baseline for
measuring the scope of Section 5 authority. 13
Araiza’s hypothetical federal gun regulation offers an
opportunity to reconsider the assumptions that define the
constitutional landscape of the post-Boerne, post-Heller world.
Even if, for the sake of argument, we accept original meaning as
the best way for the Court to derive constitutional meaning in
adjudicating constitutional disputes, it does not necessarily follow
that originalism is the appropriate baseline from which we assess
the scope of congressional enforcement authority under Section 5.
I offer two ways in which we can destabilize the linkage
between the judicially determined original meaning of
constitutional rights and the scope of congressional enforcement
authority. The first is the original meaning of the congressional
enforcement power. The history of the framing and ratification of
the enforcement clause of the Fourteenth Amendment indicates a
11. Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Protecting the Constitution from the
People: Juricentric Restrictions on Section Five Power, 78 IND. L.J. 1 (2003).
12. See Christopher W. Schmidt, Section 5’s Forgotten Years: Congressional
Power to Enforce the Fourteenth Amendment Before Katzenbach v. Morgan, 113
NW. U. L. REV. 47 (2018); Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection by
Law: Federal Antidiscrimination Legislation After Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE
L.J. 441 (2000).
13. My challenge to the operating assumption Araiza relies on in his Article
is not a critique of his decision to make that assumption. Araiza’s approach is to
work within the basic parameters the Court established in Boerne to identify a
better approach to Section 5 jurisprudence. My approach, by contrast, is to
question the parameters that Boerne established.
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robust conception of congressional interpretive authority that
would not be defined and delimited by judicial interpretations of
the Constitution. The second is a conception of the Section 5 power,
prominent before Boerne, under which the Court recognized a gap
between judicial interpretations of constitutional meaning and the
meaning that Congress attached to these constitutional provisions
when using its enforcement authority. 14 In resurrecting this lost
approach to Section 5, I suggest that judicially derived originalist
analysis could be treated, using under Araiza’s framework, as yet
another decisional heuristic, and therefore not necessarily the
baseline for “core” constitutional meaning—at least not when nonjudicial actors are expected to play a role in giving meaning to the
Constitution.
II. The Original Meaning of Section 5
Considerable evidence shows that the history of the framing
and ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment reflects an
understanding of the enforcement power that is less deferential to
Court-developed rules of constitutional interpretation than the
model of the Section 5 power that Justice Kennedy offered in
Boerne and that still holds today. 15 There is a strong case,
therefore, that an originalist judge should be skeptical of not only
the doctrine-centered approach in Boerne that Araiza critiques, but
also, more broadly, any approach to defining that Section 5 power
that places the Supreme Court as a primary constraint on federal
authority to protect Fourteenth Amendment rights. In other
words, the very same commitment to originalism as the source of
“core constitutional meaning” that motivates Araiza’s
14. I explore this theme at length in Schmidt, supra note 12.
15. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, The Reconstruction Power, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1801, 1805 (2010) (“[M]odern doctrine has not been faithful to the text, history,
and structure of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments. These
amendments were designed to give Congress broad powers to protect civil rights
and civil liberties …. Congress gave itself these powers because it believed it could
not trust the Supreme Court to protect the rights of the freedmen . . . .”); Michael
W. McConnell, Institutions and Interpretation: A Critique of City of Boerne v.
Flores, 111 HARV. L. REV. 153, 194 (1997) (“In Boerne, the Court erred in assuming
that congressional interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment is illegitimate.
The historical record shows that the framers of the Amendment expected
Congress, not the Court, to be the primary agent of its enforcement . . . .”).
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reconceptualization of how the Court should apply the Boerne
model could also be used to undermine the Boerne model itself.
The people who framed the Fourteenth Amendment and
advocated for its passage believed that Congress, using its Section
5 power, would play a leading role in protecting constitutional
rights. They frequently referred to Congress and the possibilities
of future congressional action under the Fourteenth Amendment;
they referred only infrequently to the courts. Indeed, the leading
advocates of the amendment were generally skeptical toward the
Supreme Court. 16 A central goal of the amendment, after all, was
to overturn the Dred Scott decision 17 and its holding that African
Americans could not be citizens of the United States. 18
The Congress-centered mindset of the framers of the
Fourteenth Amendment is reflected in the fact that the first
version of the amendment was framed as entirely a grant of power
to Congress: “The Congress shall have power to make all laws
which shall be necessary and proper to secure to the citizens of
each State all privileges and immunities . . . and to all persons in
the several States equal protection in the rights of life, liberty, and
property.” 19 Critics in Congress worried that phrased in this way,
as an express grant of plenary power to Congress to define the
rights of all Americans, the proposed amendment granted the
federal government excessive control over the states. 20 The Joint
Committee on Reconstruction, which drafted the Fourteenth
Amendment, eventually offered a new version of the proposed
16. See, e.g., McConnell, supra note 15, at 182 (“Section Five of the
Fourteenth Amendment was born of the fear that the judiciary would frustrate
Reconstruction by a narrow interpretation of congressional power.”).
17. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
18. See generally JOSEPH B. JAMES, THE FRAMING OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT 53–54 (1956); ROBERT J. HARRIS, THE QUEST FOR EQUALITY: THE
CONSTITUTION, CONGRESS, AND THE SUPREME COURT 53–55 (1960); Eugene
Gressman, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, 50 MICH. L. REV.
1323, 1329-33 (1952); John P. Frank & Robert F. Munro, The Original
Understanding of “Equal Protection of the Laws,” 50 COLUM. L. REV. 131, 165
(1950).
19. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st sess., 1033–34 (Feb. 26, 1866); see also
BENJAMIN B. KENDRICK, JOURNAL OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE OF FIFTEEN ON
RECONSTRUCTION 46, 50–51, 61 (1914).
20. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st sess., 1087 (Feb. 28, 1866)
(Representative Davis warning of a “centralization of power in Congress in
derogation of constitutional limitations”).
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amendment that separated the definition of the rights in the
opening section from the congressional enforcement provision in
the closing section. 21 Although the historical record does little to
illuminate the reason the Joint Committee abandoned the original
version and introduced the new one 22 (members of Congress gave
little attention to Section 5 in their debates over the Fourteenth
Amendment 23), some scholars have argued the first version offers
a key to identifying the ambitious, Congress-centered commitment
of the amendment’s framers. 24
In Boerne, Justice Kennedy offered a different interpretation
of this drafting history, presenting it as evidence of a commitment
on the part of the drafters to a more limited conception of
Congress’s enforcement power. “Under the revised Amendment,”
he wrote, “Congress’ power was no longer plenary but remedial.
Congress was granted the power to make the substantive
constitutional prohibitions against the States effective…. The
revised Amendment proposal did not raise the concerns expressed
earlier regarding broad congressional power to prescribe uniform
national laws with respect to life, liberty, and property.” 25 After
summarizing a member of Congress arguing for a more limited
view of the enforcement power, Kennedy notes, “[s]cholars of
successive generations have agreed with this assessment.” 26
Although Kennedy cited “generations” of scholars in support
of his narrow reading of Section 5, scholars who have looked at the
history Kennedy cited have questioned his interpretation of the
material. 27 He read the history in favor of his position that
21. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st sess., 1095 (Feb. 28, 1866); KENDRICK,
supra note 19, at 83–84.
22. See, e.g., Ruth Colker, The Supreme Court's Historical Errors in City of
Boerne v. Flores, 43 B.C. L. REV. 783, 798–99 (2002). John Bingham, one of the
framers of the Fourteenth Amendment, would argue during an 1871
congressional debate that the change was immaterial to the underlying meaning
of congressional power. CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 1st sess., app. 83–86 (Mar. 31,
1871); see also Michael P. Zuckert, Congressional Power under the Fourteenth
Amendment—The Original Understanding of Section Five, 3 CONST. COMMENT.
123 (1986) (discussing Bingham explanation).
23. Colker, supra note 22, at 799–812.
24. See generally HARRIS, supra note 18, at 34–53; JACOBUS TEN BROEK, THE
ANTISLAVERY ORIGINS OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 187-190 (1951).
25. Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 522–23 (1997).
26. Id. at 523.
27. This statement, McConnell notes, “must have slipped past the cite
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congressional authority under Section 5 must be constrained by
the Court’s interpretation of Section 1, based primarily on
separation of powers principles. But the primary concern of the
Thirty-Ninth Congress was not ensuring that the Court would
constrain Congress (i.e., separation of powers). Rather, the
primary concern in 1866 was federalism—a concern with how
much power Congress could exercise under Section 5 vis-à-vis the
states. As a matter of original meaning, questions of separation of
powers and judicial supremacy were not explicitly considered by
those who framed and ratified the Fourteenth Amendment. 28
So even if one accepts that the revision of the Fourteenth
Amendment from a grant of authority to Congress to its final
version indicated agreement that the Fourteenth Amendment did
not constitute an abandonment of the principle of state
sovereignty, the question remains open as to the balance of power
within the federal government when acting under the amendment.
The framers simply did not leave much of a record of their views of
the relationship between the Supreme Court and Congress under
the Fourteenth Amendment. 29 Although the issue has today
become central to Section 5 doctrine, it was not an issue of major
concern in 1866. Furthermore, even if one accepts that the
changed wording had some significance in pulling back on
congressional power there remains the question of determining
how much of a limitation the revision signaled.
checkers. Even aside from the incongruity of making a claim about ‘scholars of
successive generations’ when citing only two examples (Horace Flack in 1908 and
Alexander Bickel in 1966), neither of the examples given supports the Court's
reading …. The Court’s position—that Congress lacks ‘substantive’ power but
that it could go beyond judicially defined rights under its ‘remedial’ power—is
contradicted by both Flack and Bickel, the only historians whom the Court cited
on this point.” McConnell, supra note 15, at 177 n. 151. See also Colker, supra
note 22.
28. Robert A. Burt, Miranda and Title II: A Morganic Marriage, 1969 SUP.
CT. REV. 81, 94.
29. Consider, for example, one of the few statements on the floor of Congress
during debate on the Fourteenth Amendment explicitly referencing Section 5.
Senator Howard defended Section 5 because it “casts upon Congress the
responsibility of seeing to it, for the future, that all the sections of the amendment
are carried out in good faith, and that no State infringes the rights of persons or
property. I look upon this clause as indispensable for the reason that it imposes
upon Congress this power and this duty.” CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st sess.,
2768 (May 23, 1866).

ORIGINALISM AND THE ENFORCEMENT POWER

41

Further evidence of the broad original meaning of Section 5
can be found in the fact that many of the people who were involved
in the drafting and ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment were
also advocates for subsequent federal legislation designed to
enforce that amendment. 30
Early precedents of the Supreme Court also reflect the
prominence of this belief that Section 5 granted Congress broad
discretion to protect Fourteenth Amendment rights—with the
Court playing only a secondary, deferential role in the
development of the Section 5 power. In its 1880 ruling in Ex parte
Virginia, 31 the Court upheld a provision of the Civil Rights Act of
1875 that made it a crime to discriminate on racial grounds in the
selection of juries. In upholding the indictment of a state judge for
violating this provision, the majority opinion explained that the
Reconstruction Amendments, including the Fourteenth, “derive
much of their force from [their enforcement] provision[s].” “It is not
said,” the Court continued, “that the judicial power of the general
government shall extend to enforcing the prohibitions and to
protecting the rights and immunities guaranteed. It is not said
that branch of the government shall be authorized to declare void
any action of a State in violation of the prohibitions. It is the power
of Congress which has been enlarged. Congress is authorized to
enforce the prohibitions by appropriate legislation.” The Court
then outlined a deferential standard for assessing the scope of the
enforcement power echoing the language the John Marshall had
used in his canonical case recognizing broad discretion in Congress
when exercising its constitutionally enumerated
authority,
McCulloch v. Maryland: “Some legislation is contemplated to make
the amendments fully effective. Whatever legislation is
appropriate, that is, adapted to carry out the objects the
amendments have in view, whatever tends to enforce submission
to the prohibitions they contain, and to secure to all persons the
30. ROBERT K. CARR, FEDERAL PROTECTION OF CIVIL RIGHTS: QUEST FOR A
SWORD 36 (1947) (citing as “[p]erhaps the best evidence” that the framers of the
Civil War amendments “meant them to serve as a basis for a positive,
comprehensive federal program” the fact “that during and just after the period
when the Amendments were framed, Congress passed seven statutes establishing
just such a federal program” (citation omitted)); McConnell, supra note 15, at
175–76; Colker, supra note 22, at 814–17.
31. 100 U.S. 339 (1880).
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enjoyment of perfect equality of civil rights and the equal
protection of the laws against State denial or invasion, if not
prohibited, is brought within the domain of congressional power.” 32
The reasoning in this passage reflects an assumption, prevalent at
the time of the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment and in the
years immediately following, that when it came to the scope of
Section 5 authority, the Court should basically defer to Congress’s
judgment in determining the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Thus we can see that the history of the framing of the
Fourteenth Amendment, as well as early legislative and judicial
efforts to interpret the scope of Section 5, point toward a robust
Section 5 authority in which Congress, not the Supreme Court, is
the institution understood to have primary responsibility to
interpret the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment’s rights
protections. Boerne’s assumption that it is the particular role of the
Court—and the Court alone—to define the meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment is not supported by the original meaning
of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Originalists have tended toward judicial interpretive
supremacy. 33 But in the context of Section 5, originalism conflicts
with judicial interpretive supremacy. Considering the history of
the Fourteenth Amendment, when it comes to the Section 5 power,
the more faithfully originalist position is one that recognizes a

32. Id. at 345–46. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 421 (1819) (“Let
the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means
which are appropriate which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not
prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are
constitutional.”) See also Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 306–07 (1880).
33. Justice Scalia, for instance, advocated an extremely narrow conception
of the Section 5 power. See Nevada Dept. of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U.S.
721, 743 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that Section 5 “prophylactic
legislation” can be applied against a particular State only if it is first shown that
“the State has itself engaged in discrimination sufficient to support the exercise
of Congress's prophylactic power.”). Scalia viewed the Section 5 power as basically
a subsidiary enforcement mechanism for the Courts. For a critique of Scalia’s
approach, see Robert Post, The Supreme Court, 2002 Term—Foreword:
Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Courts, Culture, and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV.
4, 33–34 (2003) (explaining that Scalia “confuses the judicial power of allocating
individual blame and responsibility with the legislative power granted to
Congress by Section 5”).
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shared role for Congress in giving meaning to the protections of
Fourteenth Amendment.
III. Originalism, Judicial Legitimacy, and the Section 5 Power
Having shown that an originalist reading of Section 5 provides
support for broad judicial deference to congressional constitutional
interpretive authority, in this section I turn to another reason an
originalist may be skeptical of Boerne’s narrow, Court-centric
reading of Section 5. My key point here is that much of the strength
and appeal of originalism as a method of constitutional
interpretation derives from claims about the particular
competencies of judges and lawyers. The case for originalism has
less force when applied to nonjudicial actors—such as members of
Congress who are exercising their authority to enforce the
provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment.
To cite one prominent example, Justice Scalia defended
originalism because of what he saw as its particularly judicial and
lawyerly qualities. He described the Constitution as “in its nature
the sort of ‘law’ that is the business of the courts—an enactment
that has a fixed meaning that is ascertainable through the usual
devices familiar to those learned in the law.” 34 Scalia went on:
If the Constitution were not that sort of a ‘law,’ but a novel
invitation to apply current societal values, what reason would
there be to believe that the invitation was addressed to the
courts rather than to the legislature? One simply cannot say,
regarding that sort of novel enactment, that “[i]t is emphatically
the province and duty of the judicial department” to determine
its content. Quite to the contrary, the legislature would seem a
much more appropriate expositor of social values, and its
determination that a statute is compatible with the
Constitution should, as in England, prevail. 35

Interpreting the Constitution, Scalia concluded, is “essentially
lawyers’ work—requiring a close examination of text, history of
34. Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 854
(1989).
35. Id.
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the text, traditional understanding of the text, judicial precedent,
and so forth.” 36
This kind of defense of originalism may lead in two different
directions. One is judicial supremacy: because the Constitution is
a legal document, it should be left to judges and lawyers to tell the
American people what it means. This was Scalia’s belief and it is
the premise of Boerne. But there is another direction available, one
that Scalia and most other originalists have eschewed but that
nonetheless is consistent with Scalia’s defense of originalism. The
other direction is some version of interpretive pluralism: when
judges and lawyers are charged with interpreting the Constitution,
they should rely on traditional legal tools to do so; but when
nonjudicial actors are fulfilling their constitutional responsibility
to give meaning to the Constitution—such as members of Congress
when exercising their Section 5 authority—then they need not
necessarily be so constrained. The flaw in Scalia’s defense of
originalism, according to this approach, is not in his assessment of
his role as the judge in interpreting the Constitution. Its flaw is in
the idea that judges should be telling everyone else what the
Constitution is.
Even if one accepts that the Constitution should be treated as
a legal document for purposes of judicial interpretation, it need not
necessarily be this when those outside the courts are fulfilling their
constitutional responsibilities. Franklin Roosevelt famously
described the Constitution as a “layman’s document, not a lawyer’s
contract.” 37 The powers of the national government are defined,
Roosevelt said, using “generality, implication and statement of
mere objectives,” language that “flexible statesmanship of the
36. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE LAW 46 (1997). See also ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW:
THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS xxviii (2012).

Scalia was not alone among the pioneers of modern originalism in
defending the theory based on particularly judicial concerns. See, e.g., Edwin
Meese III, Toward a Jurisprudence of Original Intent, 11 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y
5, 10 (1988) (asserting that judges act properly when they evaluate the
constitutionality of act using the Constitution’s plain words as originally
understood because doing so “treat[es] the Constitution as the supreme law
and . . . enforce[es] the will of the . . . democratic majority that ratified the
constitutional provision at issue”)..
37. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Address on Constitution Day, Washington, D.C.,
THE AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=15459
(last visited Aug. 4, 2018).
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future, within the Constitution, could adapt to time and
circumstance.” 38 More recently, scholars who have defended
various forms of extrajudicial constitutionalism have echoed
Roosevelt’s characterization of the Constitution. 39
One need not be a dedicated popular constitutionalist to
recognize that Congress’ Section 5 authority could be premised on
an understanding of the Constitution as something other than a
legal document. Take, for example, Michael McConnell, one of the
most skilled and dedicated defenders of originalism, 40 who has also
written one of the most powerful critiques of Boerne. 41 McConnell
argues that Section 5 grants Congress more than simply the
authority to provide remedies for judicially defined Fourteenth
Amendment rights. His defense of a broad Section 5 power stems
not only from his reading of the history of Section 5 (i.e., an
originalist interpretation of Section 5), but also from his views on
the distinct competency and legitimacy concerns of the judiciary
and Congress. He writes:
[W]hen Congress interprets the provisions of the Bill of Rights
for purposes of carrying out its enforcement authority under
Section Five, it is not bound by the institutional constraints that
in many cases lead the courts to adopt a less intrusive
interpretation from among the textually and historically
plausible meanings of the clause in question. Because these
institutional constraints are predicated on the need to protect
the discretionary judgments of representative institutions from
uncabined judicial interference, there is no reason for
Congress—the representatives of the people—to abide by them.
Congress need not be concerned that its interpretations of the
Bill of Rights will trench upon democratic prerogatives, because
its actions are the expression of the democratic will of the
people. 42

McConnell advocates a middle-ground approach to
congressional authority under Section 5, which he labels an
38.
39.

Id.
See,

e.g., LARRY KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 216–18 (2004); Post, supra note 11, at
26.
40. See, e.g., Michael McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation
Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 947 (1995).
41. See McConnell, supra note 14.
42. Id. at 156.
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“interpretive” approach. In exercising its enforcement power,
Congress should not be required to defer to the Supreme Court’s
definition of the Fourteenth Amendment, as Boerne requires. Nor
should Congress have unfettered “substantive” authority, which
would permit Congress to “pass legislation based solely on its
legislative judgment about what rights people should have.” 43
Under McConnell’s interpretive approach, Congress’ authority is
constrained, but it is constrained by the Constitution rather than
the courts’ interpretation of the Constitution. Congress would be
limited to “good faith interpretations of the meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment, just as the judiciary is.” 44 “The question
in a Section Five case,” McConnell writes, “should be whether the
congressional interpretation is within a reasonable range of
plausible interpretations—not whether it is the same as the
Supreme Court’s.” 45 Although he does not delve into exactly what
constitutes a “good faith” or “plausible” interpretation of the
Constitution, I would posit that a dedicated originalist,
particularly one whose originalist commitments derive at least in
part from views of the distinctive capacities of judges and courts,
could accept that nonjudicial actors might in good faith rely on
nonoriginalist interpretations of the Constitution.
This alternative approach defends originalism as the best way
for courts to interpret the Constitution but it allows that
nonjudicial actors may locate alternative readings of the
Constitution—readings that may or may not align with the
originalism of judges and lawyers. In many instances, when
nonjudicial actors read the Constitution differently than judicial
actors, the courts will need to exercise their authority to “say what
the law is” and strike down the constitutional claim of the
nonjudicial actor. This would be the case whenever a court
concludes that a government action violates a provision of Section
1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, for example. But in other
instances, nonjudicial actors might engage in constitutional
decision making by relying on a reading of the Constitution that
diverges from a “judicial” reading of the Constitution (for an
originalist, this would be one based on original meaning). The
43.
44.
45.

Id. at 171.
Id.
Id. at 184.
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courts would not need to strike down this act of constitutional
decision making simply because it relies on a nonoriginalist
reading of the Constitution.
This then brings us back to Araiza’s diagnosis of current
Section 5 doctrine. If we assume that a judge who chooses
originalism as her preferred method of constitutional
interpretation does so because, at least in part, she believes it is
well suited to the role of a judge, then we might question Araiza’s
equation of originalism with identification of “core” constitutional
meaning. Originalism may be defensible as the best approach to
constitutional interpretation for the judiciary, but an originalist
judge could believe that a nonjudicial actor might, in good faith,
adopt a method of constitutional decision making that is not
originalist. A judicial originalist could accept that our
constitutional system allows nonjudicial actors to rely on modes of
constitutional engagement other than originalism—modes that
are better suited to the institutional competencies of these
nonjudicial actors. 46
Araiza equates originalist analysis with the derivation of “core
constitutional law,” which he contrasts with “mere decisional
heuristics” (such as the levels of scrutiny analysis). 47 The former is
driven by a search for constitutional truth. The latter by “concerns
about institutional competence rather than a statement of core
constitutional meaning.” 48 But this point seems to be in potential
tension with originalism as a theory of constitutional
interpretation whose proponents justify it based on its suitability
for judges. Why not treat originalism as a kind of “decisional
heuristic,” justified in terms of the institutional competence of
judges rather than some unique insight into the true meaning of
the Constitution? 49
46. For the classic accounting of “modalities” of constitutional interpretation,
with originalism recognized as just one among at least six modalities, see PHILIP
BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION (1982).
47. Araiza, Arming, supra note 2, at 1850–51, 1847.
48. Id. at 1847.
49. The strongest counter argument to my analysis is the one offered by
many modern day originalists: originalism, they argue, is not a methodology
whose justification relies on judicial competencies. Rather, it is simply the correct
way to interpret the Constitution. Regardless of whether the interpreter is a judge
or an elected official, they must be guided by the Constitution’s original meaning
because originalism is the only way. See, e.g., William Baude, Originalism as a
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Lawrence Sager, whose theory of underenforced constitutional
norms Araiza draws on for his key distinction between core
meaning and doctrinal heuristics, does not equate originalist
analysis with defining the scope of “constitutional norms” and
thereby deriving the “full conceptual boundaries” of a given
constitutional provision. 50 Sager defined an underenforced
constitutional norm as “those situations in which the Court,
because of institutional concerns, has failed to enforce a provision
of the Constitution to its full conceptual boundaries.” 51 He writes:
“[I]t is appropriate for the Supreme Court to overturn a
congressional enactment under [§] 5 if it finds that the enactment
cannot be justified by any analytically defensible conception of the
relevant constitutional concept.” 52 If we follow Sager, to demand
that Congress defer to originalist interpretation of the Fourteenth
Amendment would be the equivalent of saying that nothing but an
originalist interpretation is “analytically defensible.”
To sum up: a committed, conscientious originalist judge could
believe that originalism is the best way for judges to interpret the
Constitution while still recognizing that extrajudicial actors—such
as members of Congress—might come to different conclusions
when deciding on the best method of constitutional interpretation.
The extrajudicial actor might, for example, believe that postratification history or prudential concerns should play a stronger
role in giving meaning to open-textured constitutional provisions,
such as the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. If an
extrajudicial actor, acting on this reading of the Constitution,
passes a law or engages in some other action that the Court deems,
according to its best reading of the Constitution, to violate the
Constitution, then the Court would strike down that law if it came
before the Court in an appropriate case or controversy. But if that
extrajudicial actor took an official action based on his best reading
Constraint on Judges, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 2213, 2215 (2017) (“[M]odern originalists
have tended to deemphasize the importance of constraining judges, relying
instead on other arguments—that originalism is normatively desirable for other
reasons, that it is an account of the true meaning of the constitutional text, or
that it is required by our law.” (citations omitted)).
50. Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced
Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1213 (1978).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 1241.
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of the Constitution (which happened to be non-originalist)—and
the resulting action or legislation did not violate any judicially
defined constitutional limitations—then the conscientious
originalist judge could very well recognize the legitimacy of
methodological pluralism outside the courts.
This recognition of the possibility of different methods of
constitutional interpretation by nonjudicial actors might even
serve to better protect the interests of the originalist judge.
Originalism can be strong medicine; it can produce outcomes that
are unpopular. In situations where other governmental actors who
share constitutional responsibilities might not be constrained by
originalism, an originalist judge might welcome sharing
interpretive responsibility. It might be good for originalism and
good for the courts if originalists did not insist on interpretive
hegemony.
Consider the example of Justice Hugo Black, who, while
serving on the Supreme Court between 1937 and 1971, developed
a jurisprudence based on textualism and history that in some ways
anticipated the originalism that has come into vogue in recent
decades. Although evaluations of Black’s judicial legacy rarely
include his views on Section 5, he, perhaps more than any of his
colleagues, embraced the idea that the enforcement provisions of
the Reconstruction Amendments empowered Congress to address
activity that would not necessarily be held unconstitutional if
challenged in the courts. Justice Black’s sweeping reading of
congressional powers under Section 5 was of a piece with his
uncompromising rejection of his liberal colleague’s broad reading
of the Fourteenth Amendment. 53
When, for example, the Court confronted the “sit-in cases”—
appeals of criminal convictions of participants in lunch counter
protests against racially segregated lunch counters—Black was
adamant that neither the business operators’ racially
discriminatory policy nor the states’ use of race-neutral trespass
laws to enforce these policies violated the Equal Protection
Clause. 54 Yet he insisted at the same time that Congress had
53.
54.

See infra notes 54–58.
Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 318 (1964) (Black, J., dissenting);
CHRISTOPHER W. SCHMIDT, THE SIT-INS: PROTEST AND LEGAL CHANGE IN THE CIVIL
RIGHTS ERA 130–31, 146, 148–50 (2018).
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Section 5 authority to prohibit racial discrimination in privately
operated public accommodations. 55
Black took a similar approach to a constitutional challenge to
the poll tax. When the Court struck down the poll tax as violating
the Equal Protection Clause, Black dissented. 56 But he insisted
that Congress had Section 5 authority to ban the poll tax “if it
believes that the poll tax is being used as a device to deny voters
equal protection of the laws.” He went on: “[F]or us to undertake
in the guise of constitutional interpretation to decide the
constitutional policy question of this case amount, in my judgment,
to a plain exercise of power which the Constitution has denied us,
but has specifically granted to Congress.” 57 Black distinguished
the act of constitutional interpretation (the work of judges) from
the creation of “constitutional policy” outside the courts. The
methods Black used, as a judge, to extract meaning from the text
of the Constitution he did not demand that Congress apply when
exercising its enforcement authority.
The premise of Black’s Section 5 jurisprudence was his
recognition of a gap between judicial interpretations of Section 1
rights and congressional interpretations of Section 1 rights in the
course of exercising Section 5 authority. Black believed that
Congress could define for itself what the provisions of the
Fourteenth Amendment meant, even if that definition did not align
with the way the courts had defined its provisions. For Black, and
for the many others during the years of the Warren Court who
accepted this idea of a Section 1–Section 5 “gap,” this premise was
not some kind of bold or radical innovation. To the contrary, it was
often advanced as a more cautious route to constitutional change,
one that allowed Congress rather than the courts to take a leading
role in confronting the challenges of breaking down the structures
of white supremacy in American law and society. 58
If we believe that originalism’s justification rests in some part
of the particular competencies of judges, then we should allow that
55. Bell, 378 U.S., at 326, 331, 343, 345; Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United
States, 379 U.S. 241, 278-79 (1964) (Black, J., concurring); SCHMIDT, supra note
54, at 169–71.
56. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966) (Black, J.,
dissenting).
57. Id. at 679.
58. See Schmidt, supra note 12.
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Congress may rely upon different interpretive tools when
undertaking its constitutional responsibilities. In the context of
Section 5, we might ask why Congress need necessarily to be
limited to originalism as a methodology when exercising its role in
giving meaning to the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Black’s
jurisprudence suggest that this could be a viable alternative
approach for an originalist jurist.
IV. Conclusion
In this Essay I have revisited the questions Araiza introduces
so provocatively in Arming the Second Amendment. If Congress
were to pass a law designed to expand gun rights, using its Section
5 authority to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, how should the
Court evaluate the constitutionality of such a law? How might such
a hypothetical illuminate the strengths and weaknesses of current
Section 5 jurisprudence? I suggest that the very same analytical
moves that Araiza uses to critique the Court’s current application
of the Boerne standard could be used to question the Boerne
standard itself. For the Second Amendment hypothetical demands
that we confront Justice Scalia’s Heller decision, and this requires
that we consider the place of originalism as a method of
constitutional interpretation in Section 5 doctrine. The
introduction of originalism into our analysis of Section 5, I argue,
provides a basis to challenge the Boerne-assumption that the
Courts alone are capable of producing constitutional meaning.
As I have sought to show in the preceding pages, originalism
challenges the premise of judicial interpretive supremacy in
Section 5 jurisprudence in two ways, one historical, the other
functional. As a matter of history, there is considerable evidence
that the original understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment did
not revolve around a judicial supremacist vision of constitutional
interpretation. To the contrary, those who framed the Fourteenth
Amendment and advocated for its passage and ratification
assumed that Congress, not the courts, would take the lead in
giving meaning to the general language of the Amendment’s first
section.
As a matter of function—that is, as a matter of creating
constitutional practices that operate to protect the core principles
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of the Constitution—placing judicial originalism into the
foreground of our discussion of Section 5 jurisprudence offers
additional support for a broader reading of the congressional
enforcement power than currently exists today under the doctrinal
standard of Boerne.
Araiza argues that his approach offers a way in which the
Court can reconcile “its insistence on stating constitutional
meaning and its ostensible respect for congressional
determinations that Congress is best-suited to make.” 59 These
goals, I suggest, are in some tension with one another. These
tensions are placed in sharp relief when we consider the judgecentered rationales that bolstered originalism’s rise to prominence
as a method of judicial constitutional interpretation. Attention to
the competencies of Congress indicates that the Court should be
less insistent on its claims for interpretive supremacy; or, at least
it should be less insistent in its claims for supremacy over the
proper methodology by which the meaning of the Constitution can
be discerned.
In situations where judges cannot justify robust Fourteenth
Amendment rights protections on originalist grounds, they should
welcome congressional initiatives that expand rights protections
under its enforcement authority. Recognizing a potential gap
between judicial interpretation of Section 1 and congressional
enforcement of Section 5 offers a way to protect the integrity of
originalism as a theory as well as the legitimacy of the courts.
Originalism is most powerful as an interpretive theory designed to
impose meaningful limits on judges. Its constraints need not, and
perhaps should not, similarly constrain Congress when it acts
under its Section 5 authority. This is the approach Justice Black
embraced in the 1960s. Extending broad deference to Congress
when enforcing Fourteenth Amendment rights he believed better
justified his commitment to the constraints of textualism and
originalism. If future Congresses were to do more to exercise their
enforcement authority to protect the rights of Americans—
whether they be the religious, economic, or gun rights favored by
the conservatives, or the antidiscrimination agenda favored by
liberals—originalist judges might want to reconsider Boerne’s
premise of judicial interpretive supremacy.
59.

Araiza, supra note 2, at 1893.

